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Considerations from biology suggest (1) that human interests can be generalized as 
reproductive, involving activities by individuals that tend to promote the survival of 
their individualized sets of genes; (2) that ethical, moral and legal questions arise 
out of conflicts of interest that exist because of our history of genetic differences; 
(3) that human behavior probably always involves egoistic tendencies and moral 
inconsistency; (4) that the stages of moral development described by social scientists 
correspond to the patterns of life effort discussed by biologists;(5) that the idealized 
moral systems of philosophy and religion have been developed as models that are 
promoted in others but not (or more than) in one's self; and (6)that  what are 
usually seen as the closest approaches to these idealized models are the sources of 
our most severe problems because they involve between-group competition and strife. 
Ethical, moral and legal questions arise out of conflicts of interest among human individuals 
and groups. Although this assertion seems to be accepted universally, those who write on 
ethics, morality and law rarely emphasize it (Pound, 1941; Perry, 1954; Kelsen, 1957, repre- 
sent the exceptions). Evidently, no student of human behavior has undertaken the obvious 
challenge of explicitly identifying human interests and quantifying their conflicts. Equity 
theory from psychology, network and exchange theory from sociology and anthropology, 
and theories of  interest from law, political science and economics are partial attempts. 
These theories, however, are all restricted to a superficial level, involving only reciprocal 
transfers of  good or beneficient acts. They neither identify the ultimate significance of goods 
and beneficient acts, nor deal satisfactorily with the all-important class of  interactions that 
frustrated equity theorists have termed 'deep and intimate' (Walster, Walster & Berscheid, 
1978). In other words, these theories provide no means of defining human interests in a 
general or complete sense, therefore, no means of  dealing generally with the intensities and 
directions of  individual efforts (see Alexander, 1979, and references therein). 
A theory of  interests is a theory of lifetimes: what they are about and how their goals are 
achieved. A growing body of information and theory from biology now provides a reason- 
able and testable answer: lifetimes have been molded by natural selection to yield the 
greatest likelihood of survival of the individual's genetic materials. This likelihood is maxi- 
mized by success in reproduction, which includes producing offspring, and assisting both 
descendant and non-descendant relatives. The 'deep and intimate' interactions causing diffi- 
culty to equity theorists are actually those most directly involving reproduction-those 
occurring between mates, potential mates and relatives. The currencies that mold the proxi- 
mate mechanisms of altruism in these interactions are genetic, not a matter of returned 
goods or services, and this is the reason the payoffs have not been apparent to investigators 
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outside biology. Even the investments and returns of reciprocity (exchange, equity) are 
ultimately comprehensible only in terms of their eventual effects on the 'deep and intimate' 
interactions of mates and relatives. Included are wealth, status, good will and innumerable 
other items. 
Biologists divide lifetimes into somatic and reproductive effort: use of calories and taking 
of risks in (1) building the body or soma (= amassing resources) and (2) using the soma to 
reproduce (= redistributing resources in the interests of one's own genetic materials). Repro- 
ductive effort is in turn divisible into mating effort (on behalf of gametes), parental effort 
(on behalf of offspring) and extraparental nepotistic effort (on behalf of all relatives other 
than offspring). There are good reasons for supposing that normal lifetimes include no other 
kind of effort (Alexander, 1979). 
I would regard the central paradoxes of moral philosophy to be those of (1) the incom- 
patibility of egoism and utilitarianism (seeking the greatest benefits to one's self versus seek- 
ing some version of the greatest benefits to the greatest number) and (2) the associated prob- 
lem of duality in human nature. These paradoxes have been developed and discussed in 
many forms, but always independently of the current biological view of interests and life- 
times. I shall argue that they remain paradoxes not because of some inherent irresolvability 
but because those concerned with them have not adequately discussed the costs and benefits 
of either egoism or altruism. Kalin (1968), for example, speaks of 'winning' and 'coming out 
on top', and Frankena (1973, 1981) of getting 'the best score', but neither describes the 
actual currency involved. Some authors speak of survival, but it is unlikely that humans or 
any other organism have evolved to survive (Alexander, 1979, 1982b), and it is easy to 
show that they all do things that reduce their likelihood of survival. Essentially all authors 
consider pleasure or happiness as reward (benefit) and pain and suffering as punishment 
(cost), but none can explain in egoistic terms either the voluntary acceptance of pain or the 
pleasure of helping others. Because the indisputable prevalence of egoistic behavior eliminates 
any likelihood of a purely altruistic or utilitarian society, except as an unattained (and as yet 
unexplained) pursuit or ideal, the problem of duality, and of moral inconsistency as normal 
behavior, persists. 
Biological theories of interests and lifetimes have the power to resolve these paradoxes, at 
least in terms of the natural history of moral systems (the 'why' of behavior in respect to 
morality). Thus, an organism whose interests are in its own genetic survival must first 
develop a soma (be a wholly 9r largely egoistic juvenile), then reproduce (show the 'altruism' 
of parenthood and nepotism) while maintaining the soma by which it continues to repro- 
duee (thus retaining egoistic tendencies during adulthood). Direct and indirect reciprocity 
(Alexander, 1979) are distinctive human overlays that add to the complexity, but they 
create no special problems. They may be seen as indirect somatic or nepotistic efforts routed 
through pseudo- or temporarily-altruistic investments in the welfare of others who are 
expected to reciprocate with interest. 
The stages of moral development in the individual, as interpreted by Kohlberg (1981) and 
others, are remarkably supportive of this biological view. Represented, first, is a purely 
somatic (selfish, 'amoral') stage. This is followed by the introduction of reciprocity through 
a system of rewards and punishment, usually by the parent. The individual gradually fore- 
goes immediate rewards in favor, I would argue, of larger later ones (reciprocity). Acceptable 
rewards may be both increasingly later and increasingly less direct (in the senses of involving 
diverse currencies, and of coming from society at large rather than the person or persons 
directly involved in the original social act). Eventually the individual also begins to forego 
personal (somatic) rewards in favor of unreciprocated rewards to others (nepotism). And he 
becomes increasingly able to assess the profitability of social acts without outside help. 
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From these arguments about interests it follows that conflicts of interest arise out of the 
history of genetic differences. This hypothesis is strongly supported by the absence of 
observed conflicts among non-human individuals in clones and other cases of long-standing 
genetic identity, and by the general diminution of altruism with decreasing relatedness within 
human societies the world over. It explains human individuality, and bears upon powerful 
human issues, such as what Wallace called 'the impossibility, despite all the labor of God, 
Freud and the Devil, of  one man fully understanding another, or the loneliness of existence' 
which he regarded as 'a pan-human theme'. It explains the unique co-operativeness of 
unrelated pairs pledged to lifetime monogamy, and of genetically different workers in the 
colonies of social wasps, bees, ants and termites. In both cases the genetically different 
individuals involved share interests because they reproduce through the same third parties: 
the offspring produced jointly by the monogamous pair and the siblings of worker insects 
produced by their common mother. It is significant that Kohlberg's f'mal stage of moral 
development is that in which the individual has learned for himself how best to assess his 
personal costs and benefits in following (and using) whatever social rules prevail. 
Viewing humans and their moral behavior in terms of natural selection provides stark and 
dramatic answers to some serious and very general questions: the incompleteness of justice; 
the persistence of conflicts of interest; the failure of  idealized moral systems; and the 
absence of  universal happiness and satisfaction. Part of the answers lie in the relative nature 
of success in evolutionary terms: 
In natural selection the likelihood of a genetic element persisting depends entirely on its rate 
of change in frequency in relation to its alternatives; changes in absolute numbers are 
irrelevant. Among the attributes of living creatures, whatever can be shown to have resulted 
from the action of natural selection may be expected to bear this same relationship to its 
alternatives. Thus, we should not be surprised to discover that the behavioral striving of 
individual humans during history has been explicitly formed in terms of relative success in 
reproductive competition, that justice is necessarily incomplete, that happiness is not easily 
made universal, and that ethical questions continue to plague us, and can even become more 
severe when everything else seems to be going well (Alexander, 1979: 240). 
I stress that our interests are not individual because of genetic differences per se, or 
current genetic differences, because such information has never been directly available to 
humans. Relatives are known through circumstantial evidence, and only recently have 
geneticists learned what the average relatedness actually is for relatives whose learned assump- 
tions about relatedness from genealogical connections and kinds of social interactions are 
nevertheless usually correct. The individualized genetic constitutions of the successions of 
our ancestors caused natural selection to save and mold proximate mechanisms whereby 
appropriate efforts could be mounted by individuals in each successive generation to realize 
their separate and individualized interests. We learn who our relatives and friends are, and 
how to treat them; but our learning responses are themselves evolved, and often very specific 
and channeled. 
The hypothesis that conflicts of interest derive from the history of genetic differences 
also generates new and sometimes startling questions: What are the benefits of the group to 
the selfishly reproducing individual? Why does one kind of ultrasocial group (eusocialinsects) 
achieve its greatest numbers and unity (up to 22 million) as a single nuclear family in which 
one individual does all of  the reproduction while the other (humans) achieves its greatest 
numbers and unity (now approaching one billion in China) by leveling the reproductive 
success and opportunities of  its members (through socially-imposed monogamy, graduated 
income taxes, gradations of negative correlations of government support with family size, 
restrictions on 'free' enterprise etc)? How do these questions relate to the morality of 
individuals and the idealized moral systems discussed by moral philosophers? 
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The altruism of  human nepotism and reciprocity is discriminative: Different relatives, and 
relatives of different needs, are distinguished. Friends are treated individually. As yet, no 
evidence of truly indiscriminate, species- or population-wide altruism has been reported for 
any organism, and there is no undisputed evidence for unlearned recognition of relatives in 
any species (Alexander, 1982a). These facts are crucial to understanding moral paradoxes 
and the rise of  moral systems. Indiscriminate altruism requires no special proximate mechan- 
isms-no social learning. I would venture that without genetic individuality, and the con- 
sequent discriminative altruism in nepotism and reciprocity, social learning would have 
remained simple, and human society as we know it could not have evolved. The very con- 
eepts of  ethical, moral and legal would be unknown. 
To think of  humans existing without conflicts of  interest is to assume situations involv- 
ing or mimicking group selection, in a way explicitly opposing the notion of  individuals 
striving to maximize their separate reproductive successes. It seems to me that this is the 
ideal state of  morality postulated by philosophers and social scientists. If  so, perhaps biology 
gives us the reason for understanding interpretations such as that of  Perry (1954: 100). 
Morality is like a cultivated field in the midst of the desert. It is a partial and precarious con- 
quest. Ground that is conquered has to be protected against the resurgence of original 
divisive forces. The moralized life is never immune against demoralization. At the same time 
that morality gains ground in one direction it may lose ground in another. Changes in the 
natural and historical environment and the development of man himself are perpetually 
introducing new factors and requiring a moral reorganization to embrace them. In the last 
analysis all depends on the energy, perseverance, and perpetual vigilance of the human person. 
Numerous philosophers have suggested that morality, at least as expressed in the behavior 
of  individuals, is in fact only an ideal, or a pursuit, and not something that is actually 
realized. This idea seems consistent with the approach from evolutionary biology that I have 
been describing. Thus, it is common, if  not universal, to regard morality in the behavior of  
an individual as consisting of  a kind of altruism that yields the altruist less than he giyes. In a 
utilitarian system (defining utilitarianism as promoting the greatest good to the greatest 
number) morality would not always require that complete and indiscriminate altruism cause 
individual losses. This would not, for example, be the case when the interests of  the group 
and the interests of  the individuals comprising the group are the same. Such a confluence of 
interests would happen each time the group was threatened ~xternally in such fashion that 
complete co-operation by its members would be necessary to dissipate the threat, and when 
failure of  the group to dissipate the threat would more severely penalize any remaining 
individuals than would the use of  all the individual's effort to (successfully) support them 
(this is the true, but in these times of nuclear threats forgotten, meaning of the term 
'national security'). In other circumstances, as when some competitiveness has a likelihood 
of benefiting individuals in the group (i.e. the individuals' interests are not all completely 
tied up in the survival of  the group or its success in dissipating some external threat), 
morality of  an ideal sort would require the kind of genetic altruism, unlikely in evolutionary 
terms, in which the altruist truly gets back less than he gives. Of course, if an external threat 
came from another group of humans, the deffmition of morality as indiscriminate altruism 
would again be in jeopardy. 
Reflecting on these circumstances, we see that if  approaches to morality are expressed 
consistently, and to the degree usually achieved in society, because there is continual 
pressure to bring about a condition of  morality, this pressure is likely to be applied by each 
individual so as to cause his neighbors, if  possible, to be a little more moral than himself. To 
say it another way, it would be to the advantage of  each individual that other individuals in 
his society--especially those not closely related to him-actually achieve the ideal of 
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completely moral behavior. Any ideally moral person would incidentally 'help' every other 
person in the society, however slightly, to achieve the goals that evolutionists believe have 
driven evolution b y  natural selection, because he would hurt himself (a competitor) by dis- 
pensing his beneficence indiscriminately. Accordingly, one might expect that every individ- 
ual in a society would gain from exerting at least a little effort toward encouraging other 
individuals to be a little more moral (altruistic) than they otherwise might have been. Among 
the many ways of furthering this aim is included the setting up of an idealized model of 
morality and the encouragement of  everyone (else) to become like that. One way of promot- 
ing this outcome is to designate as heroes (i.e. as appropriate targets for special rewards) 
those who most closely approach the ideal moral condition. This line of reasoning predicts 
that sainthood will be awarded to individuals who spend their lives on explicitly anti- 
reproductive behavior. The prevalence among saints of asceticism, self-denial, isolation from 
relatives, devotion to the welfare of strangers, and otherwise indiscriminate tendencies to be 
altruistic supports this hypothesis. So does the fact that sainthood is generally awarded 
(long) after the death of  the awardee. 
So we are provided with the general hypothesis that the concept of morality, and the 
establishment of systems promoting ideal moralism, at least appear to have as their aim the 
support of  the goals of society as a whole. For this reason, within society, each and every 
individual may be expected to promote in his associates tendencies to be moral. Because of 
continuing possibilities of  differential success within groups, though, we can also understand 
that each and every individual may also be expected to promote a slightly greater degree of 
'morality' (altruism) in his neighbor than in himself. And we can understand why the 
idealized morality of the philosophers is never a reality in society as a whole, and occurs 
only as an accident, a manipulation or in special circumstances. 
The question may be raised, why anyone should be susceptible to being manipulated 
unduly far in the direction of morality, given that we have been subjected to such mani- 
pulations for so long? Why, in other words, should moralizing ever be effective? 
I think there are at least four contributing factors. First, the degrees of morality that are 
actually reproductively appropriate will vary dramatically as societies move between periods 
of extreme danger and relative security, making it difficult to know how to behave. When 
will a specified degree of failure to accede to exhortations to be altruistic cost more than it 
yields, because of  (1) failure of the group on which one depends for success, or (2) responses 
within the group to one's failure to be altruistic? 
Second, individuals may be expected to take advantage of the dramatic shifts in most 
profitable degrees of altruism to deceive others about costs or dangers so as to induce in them 
unduly altruistic behavior. It is obvious that aspiring leaders often use such deception to pro- 
mote their own leadership, as an antidote to the supposed threat and as a promoter of unity. 
Third, we may expect that the individuals in a society such as we have been describing will 
evolve to deceive others about the degree of altruism they themselves are exhibiting: Every- 
one will wish to appear more altruistic than he is. There are two reasons: This appearance, if  
credible, is more likely to lead to direct social rewards than its alternatives. It is also more 
likely to encourage others to be more altruistic. If one's associates are altruistic, then he can 
afford to be more altruistic than if they were not. We may expect everyone to be concerned 
that everyone else appear altruistic so that people in general will feel comfortable with a 
higher degree of altruism than would otherwise be the case. 
Fourth, if kin recognition is learned (Alexander, 1979, 1982a), mistakes are likely in this 
context, and one may insinuate himself into the role of relative so as to receive inappropriate 
nepotism, or even to pretend to be nepotistieally altruistic so as to receive the appropriate 
altruistic responses. 
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Haying upon the tendency of everyone to strive to appear more altruistic than one's self, 
and using the other ploys just described, may produce a considerable amount of successful 
social manipulation. These various factors seem to be the elements necessary to produce and 
maintain what we commonly call moral systems, and moral behavior in individuals. They 
represent the means for resolving the philosophers' paradoxes with respect to morality, and 
for understanding why moral systems have always fallen short of our ideals, and why we 
establish and maintain such ideals. If accurate, these arguments may also clarify the routes 
by which we can most closely approach what are seen as idealized moral systems, and 
perhaps most confidently avert moral disasters. 
The introduction of  indirect reciprocity, whereby society as a whole or some large part of 
it provides the reward for altruism and the punishment for selfishness, simultaneously served 
both society and the individuals comprising it, and provided the vehicle for socially mani- 
pulating individuals to levels and kinds of altruism detrimental to them (or their reproduc- 
tive success). It is somewhat paradoxical that the tendencies and pressures in the direction of  
idealized moral systems should serve everyone up to a point, but then be transformed by the 
same forces that molded them into manipulations of the behavior of  individuals that are 
explicitly against their interests and in the interests of those ostensibly promoting everyone's 
interests by promoting trends toward morality in the system. 
The concept of a single just God for all people, however it is believed to have originated, 
implies social unity. I would regard this concept as one representation of an idealized moral 
system arising out of  religion; and it is just as difficult to follow as those generated from 
moral philosophy. It is not trivial that the concept of a single God for all people differs from 
that of a "tribal' God looking out for the interests of only one group or society. Adhering to 
this concept requires denial of practices like slavery, caste systems and other within-group 
discrimination. Despite its prominence and use during times when groups are threatened 
externally, the concept in some sense fails whenever such external threats involve (or are) 
other groups of people. This failure is, of  course, denied by the invention of anti-Gods, or 
Devils, and the ascription of others' motivations to their control. As a US Christian picketing 
over the arrival of some Russians put it, 'I couM love them if they were my enemies, but 
they are the enemies of God'! 
The concept of God also implies continuity of social uni ty-a  long-lasting, intergener- 
ationai social contract. If nepotism is our evolved function, then God (in the sense of vex 
populi, vex Dei) really can guarantee a reward 'in Heaven', or after our individual deaths-or 
a kind of 'everlasting life' (for our genetic materials)-as a reward for moral behavior during 
life. This guarantee is in the form of a renewable contract in reciprocity which occurs when 
those who remain after our death use our own life of 'morality' to judge our children (and 
other relatives who remain) as suitable risks to continue receiving (and giving, and receiving 
and giving, and receiving and giving . . . )  the benefits of social reciprocity. The guarantee 
actually exists because, unless those in a position to honor it do so for us, the same 
possibility will not exist for them. The ceremonies associated with death, and the reverence 
given to the dead, are surely, in part, ritually related to this guarantee. 
If morality tends to mimic the effects of group selection, if moralizing seeks to promote 
this mimicry, and if tendencies for people to be altruistic are self-reinforcing within societies, 
then it is not remarkable that sincere, knowledgeable and well-meaning people sometimes 
resent the arguments that natural selection is not powerful at group levels, and that humans, 
as individuals, have evolved to be interested in furthering their own reproduction. Such 
persons may well believe (or sense) that publicizing or stressing such arguments, even if they 
are correct, will diminish altruism and morality by providing an anti-moral model. The indi- 
cations that humans have regarded moral models as extremely important in achieving societal 
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goals cause such a belief to be completely understandable. Nevertheless, this attitude runs 
counter to the goal of diminishing human problems through improving self-knowledge. 
Our truly serious problems of morality and law stem, not from the behavior of individuals, 
but from the behavior of groups that may show most dramatically within themselves the 
indiscriminate altruism that represents approaches to the idealized morality of philosophy 
and religion. Indeed, loyalty and patriotism are revered as the highest forms of morality and 
virtue within groups. But this same level and kind of within-group 'morality' has also created 
our most devastating problems-those involving intergroup conflict-that we must somehow 
supercede. What we seek, when we think of world peace and world law, has no precedent in 
the history of life, not to say that of humankind. There seems to be no evidence that 
humans or any other organism have achieved the species-wide indiscriminate altruism repre- 
sented in the idealized moral models of philosophy and religion. 
I offer only one conclusion in this brief and perhaps unsettling essay: that, in the effort 
to solve humanity's most profound problems, there is potentially great value in adding a 
perspective from modern evolutionary biology to those developing out of philosophy, the 
social sciences, religion, history and the humanities. This biological perspective must be 
added, not as an argument for determinism, but precisely to the contrary, as a possible way 
to greater freedom, deriving from greater knowledge of the cause-effect patterns that under- 
lie our history and our nature. Some of my colleagues in biology, and many people outside 
biology, deny that humans can be understood in biological terms. Others cling to the notion 
that we evolved by an innocuous (and hypothetical) form of group selection and can some- 
how return to it. Or they argue that if this is not the case, we should deny the truth and 
pretend ourselves toward world peace and human justice; or that it is better to be ignorant 
with an idealized moral model before us than to know about an immoral history. I believe 
that people who think in these fashions are wrong. Worse, because of the enormity of the 
problems that face us, I regard approaches that deny biology, and sometimes deny reality, 
as potentially deadly. Essentially everyone thinks of himself as well-meaning, but from my 
viewpoint a society of  well-meaning people who understand themselves and their history 
very well is a better milieu than a society of well-meaning people who do not. 
